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Canada's Iraq Policy since 1990

by Bill Janzen

"This article was written for inclusion in the July-September 2002 issue of the Mennonite Central Committee Peace Office Newsletter, and is used by permission of the author and the Newsletter."

Canada's policy on Iraq is not radically different from that of the United States though, as in other cases, there are somewhat stronger elements of multilateralism, "soft power," and humanitarianism, and, of course, Canada is a much smaller player.

In 1990 Canada supported the several U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the subsequent U.S.-led military action to push Iraq out of Kuwait. Canada also supported the 1991 resolutions to continue the sanctions and to send in weapons inspectors, to press Iraq to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction.

Canada has also demonstrated some concern for the Iraqi people. Already in 1991 Foreign Affairs officials responded quickly to the requests from NGOs for getting humanitarian shipments cleared. Canada also encouraged the development of the Oil for Food (OFF) program. In 1996 when Lloyd Axworthy, whose commitment to peace had led him to travel to Iraq in 1990, became Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister, he hired Dr. Eric Hoskins as a personal advisor. Hoskins had been on the 1991 Harvard Study Team and had done a lot to publicize the plight of the Iraqi people.

Axworthy's interest was timely because, despite the OFF program and progress in weapons inspection, interaction between Iraq and the U.S. was deteriorating. Late in 1998 the U.S. withdrew the inspectors and started a bombing campaign with the U.K. Then, early in 1999, Canada started a two-year term on the UNSC. Canada now proposed three U.N. study panels, to focus on the humanitarian needs, the weapons situation, and Kuwaiti prisoners of war and related matters. Their reports helped in the long 1999 debate that culminated in UNSC Resolution 1284.

Sanctions Modified

This resolution removed the oil ceiling, thereby enabling Iraq to import many more goods. It authorized list?based approval to ease importation of permissible goods. It called for a cash component so that some revenue from Iraq's oil exports would go to Iraq in cash, albeit under U.N. monitoring, to help pay civil servants and teachers. And it made the weapons inspection commission accountable to the U.N. Secretary General, rather than to the UNSC, restricting the influence of individual Council members. Also, the inspectors would be more representative of the international community.

Despite these positive signs, the new resolution kept the basic concept that money from Iraq's oil sales, instead of going to Iraq, went into a U.N. account and was then used to pay international suppliers of goods ordered by Iraq. This prevented Iraq from buying weapons, but it also restricted its economic activity enormously! The cash component, meant to be an exception to this rule, was never operationalized because, say officials, Iraq did not accept monitoring.

The new resolution also continued to allow any member of the sanctions committee, e.g., the U.S., to block a vast range of items on the ground of "dual use" suspicions including parts for water treatment systems and medical, electrical, and communications equipment. It also kept the provision that 30 percent of the revenue from Iraq's oil sales would be used to compensate parties, including big oil companies, for losses in the Gulf War. Though later reduced to 25 percent, it is a shocking amount given the needs of the Iraqi people.

After this resolution was passed Canadian officials tried to strengthen its positive elements, particularly the list?based approval system, in part because, early in 2000, a Canadian Parliamentary committee recommended, unanimously, that nonmilitary sanctions be lifted. Also, Axworthy funded The Sanctions Decade, a 275-page study by the International Peace Academy, to have the Security Council look more self?critically at the use of sanctions generally. Canada also continued to make diplomatic visits to Iraq. And it provided some funding for UNICEF, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and some NGOs, while saying that the Iraqi government could do much more to help its people.

Canada also continued its diplomatic support for U.S. actions, including the bombing, and used its naval forces to assist in restricting Iraq's efforts to bypass the sanctions. Canadian officials argue that an "unfettered Iraq" would pose a danger to its neighbors and that despite their concern for the people of Iraq, constraints on its government are needed. For this reason they also support the new "smart sanctions." They favor regional disarmament but say that Iraq must do more first.

On the question of another war, Canada says that the U.N. is the best mechanism for addressing Iraq issues and that if a war became imminent, it would make a decision taking all legal, political, and security concerns into account.

Bill Janzen is director of the Ottawa Office of MCC Canada.